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Abstract:  This paper describes an ongoing project to measure governance using cross-
country perceptions data.  The governance indicators measure six dimensions of 
governance and cover 209 countries and territories for 1996-2004.  They are based on 
several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 
37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations.  We present the 
estimates of governance, and the margins of error capturing the range of likely values for 
each country.  We show how these margins of error should be taken into account when 
considering cross-country differences and changes over time in governance. We find 
that in a number of countries the quality of governance improved significantly in the short 
term.  Yet deteriorations also took place in some other countries, while in many there 
was little change. There has been no worldwide improvement in governance on average.    
 
We argue that perceptions-based data provide valuable insights relative to objective 
data on governance, and that individual objective measures of governance provide an 
incomplete picture of even the quite particular dimensions of governance that they are 
intended to measure.  We also show that margins of error are not unique to perceptions-
based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all efforts to measure 
governance, including objective indicators.  We also empirically investigate the 
importance of ideological biases in expert assessments of corruption and find little 
evidence that they are present.   
 
Governance indicators and per capita incomes are highly correlated across countries.  
Recent research shows that this correlation captures an important causal effect running 
from measures of governance such as these to per capita incomes.  Critics of this view 
argue that the correlation captures substantial reverse causation from incomes to 
governance, and is tainted by "halo effects" where rich countries receive good ratings 
simply because they are rich.  We review available evidence on these two critiques and 
find it to be lacking. 
 
The data, as well as a web-based graphical interface, are available at 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/.   
____________________________________ 
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1.  Introduction   
 
"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in 
numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you 
cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind." 
 
"If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it." 
 
 -- Sir William Thomas Kelvin 
 
 
Today there is widespread consensus among policymakers and academics that 
good governance and strong institutions lie at the core of economic development.  The 
intellectual foundations for this view are not new, and go back at least to the seminal 
work of Douglass North and earlier.  What is new is that over the past 10 years there has 
been an explosion of careful empirical work that has documented a strong causal link 
running from better institutions to better development outcomes.  Figure 1 summarizes 
the main results from several recent cross-country empirical studies.  On the horizontal 
axis we graph a measure of institutional quality capturing the protection of property rights 
(the Rule of Law indicator described in more detail below).  On the vertical axis we plot 
real GDP per capita, and we have normalized both variables to have a mean of zero and 
a standard deviation of one.  The country-level data in the graph illustrates the strong 
correlation between governance and per capita incomes.  This recent research has gone 
beyond the simple correlation shown in the graph to identifying a strong causal impact of 
governance on development.  The upward-sloping lines capture several estimates of the 
causal impact of governance on per capita incomes that have been isolated using 
various techniques in recent studies.1  The striking observation that emerges from this 
graph is that the estimated causal impact of institutions on economic development is 
large:  a realistic one-standard deviation improvement in governance would raise per 
capita incomes in the long run by a factor of two to three.  Such improvement in 
governance corresponds, for instance, to the improvement from the levels of Somalia to 
those of Laos, or from Laos to Lebanon, or from that of Lebanon to Italy, or from Italy to 
Canada. 
 
                                                
1 These are Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000), Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), Alcala and 
Ciccone (2004), and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). 
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A key factor enabling this line of recent research and informing policy discussions 
related to governance has been the availability of more and better cross-country and 
within-country data on governance and institutional quality.  The above quotations by the 
19th-century British physicist Lord Kelvin remind us of the importance of measurement 
and quantification, both for research on the causes and consequences of governance, 
as well as for policy advice to improve governance.2  One such measurement effort has 
been our work since the late 1990s to construct a dataset of aggregate cross-country 
governance indicators using subjective data on perceptions of governance from a large 
number of data sources.  In Section 2 of this paper we report on the latest update of our 
governance indicators, which measure six dimensions of governance over the period 
1996-2004 and spanning 209 countries and territories.  The indicators are based on 
several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 
37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. 
 
Reformers in many governments, aid donors, members of civil society, and 
investors increasingly recognize governance as key for development.  This in turn has 
increased the demand for monitoring the quality of governance both across countries 
and within countries over time.   For example, one of the eligibility criteria for the United 
States governments new aid program, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), is that 
a country must score above the median of all potentially-eligible countries on the Control 
of Corruption indicator described in this paper.3  One of the messages from our work is 
that it is important to take into account the inevitable uncertainty associated with 
estimates of governance.  An attractive feature of our approach to measuring 
governance is that it allows us to quantify the precision or reliability of our estimates of 
governance.  Over time the addition of data has improved the precision of our 
governance indicators relative to previous years.  However, the margins of error 
associated with estimates of governance are not trivial, and need to be taken into 
account when comparing governance across countries.   
 
                                                
2 One should be careful though of quoting Kelvin, he also famously noted that "X-rays will prove 
to be a hoax..." and "Radio has no future"! 
3 This is just one example.  Others include the use of the World Bank's Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings to determine the allocation of highly-concessional lending 
in low-income countries, and the use of our indicators by the Netherlands development agency 
for monitoring governance in countries where it is active. 
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The same margins of error also complicate the measurement of changes over 
time in governance, an issue of obvious concern to many policymakers.  In this chapter 
we present new results on how to assess the statistical significance of changes over 
time in our measures of governance.  We discuss these issues regarding the 
interpretation of comparisons of governance across countries and over time in Section 3 
of this chapter.  We find that although many of the observed changes over time in our 
governance indicators are too small to signal statistically or economically meaningful 
changes in governance, there are countries where there have been substantial changes 
in governance, both improvements and declines.  We also find that the likelihood of 
observing significant changes increases substantially with the length of the time period 
under consideration.  Importantly, in examining some of our underlying data sources we 
also find that there is no evidence of changes in global averages of governance 
worldwide.  Although our aggregate indicators are scaled to have the same mean and 
standard deviation in each period and thus only track relative changes in governance 
over time, the absence of trends in global averages suggests that there is little difference 
between these relative and absolute changes in governance. 
 
In Section 4 we discuss several issues that arise when using perceptions-based 
data to measure governance across countries.  We first note that often subjective data is 
the only type of information available for various dimensions of governance, and that the 
quality of subjective data on governance has improved over time.  We also note that the 
margins of error we emphasize in our work are not unique to the perceptions data we 
use to construct our aggregate governance indicators: measurement error is pervasive 
among all measures of governance and institutional quality.  An advantage of our 
measures of governance is that we are able to be explicit about the accompanying 
margins of error, whereas these are most often left implicit with objective measures of 
governance.  To remedy this we provide a simple calculation which suggests that 
margins of error in objective indicators of governance are at least as large as those we 
report for our subjective indicators.    We also investigate in more detail discrepancies 
between subjective and objective measures of very specific dimensions of the regulatory 
environment.  We show that firms’ survey responses about their tax burden, and the 
ease of starting a new business, reflect not only the de jure regulations governing these 
issues, but also the overall institutional and governance environment in which these 
regulations are applied.  Finally we show that concerns about the importance of 
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ideological biases in subjective governance assessments are relatively unimportant. 
These findings emphasize the importance of relying on a full range of measures of 
governance, and not exclusively subjective or objective measures, when assessing the 
quality of governance across countries.  
 
We began by noting that there is widespread consensus among academics and 
policymakers that governance is important for economic development.  But this view is 
not without its critics.  One line of criticism argues that the strong positive correlation 
observed between subjective measures of governance and per capita incomes does not 
reflect a causal impact of governance on development, but rather is mostly due to “halo 
effects” – respondents rating countries might provide good governance scores to richer 
countries simply because they are richer.  While this is certainly a possible source of 
bias, in Section 5 of this chapter we show that it is unlikely to lead to a significant upward 
bias in the correlation between income and governance.   Another line of criticism is 
implicitly based on the view that the observed correlation between governance and per 
capita income largely reflects and important causal effect running from incomes to 
governance:  as countries get richer institutional quality will improve.  This view has lead 
some observers of the poor development performance of countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa to argue that the on average poor governance of countries in the region should be 
"discounted" because per capita incomes in the region are also low.  However, we argue 
that existing evidence does not support a strong causal channel operating in this 
direction – most of the correlation between governance and per capita incomes reflects 
causation from governance to per capita incomes.  In light of this we suggest that it 
would be inappropriate to divert attention from the weak average governance 
performance of the region simply because the region is poor.  While we focus on Africa 
because of the recent emphasis in the aid community on the region, the fallacy of 
discounting the extent of misgovernance in a country or region due to low incomes 
applies more generally to any setting with poor governance and low incomes.   
 
2.  Updated Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 
 
 In this section we briefly describe the update of our governance indicators for 
2004, as well as some minor backwards revisions to the indicators for 1996-2002.  Our 
basic methodology has not changed from past years, and a detailed discussion can be 
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found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004), and in the working paper version of 
this chapter (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005)).  We construct measures of six 
dimensions governance: 
 
1. Voice and Accountability – measuring political, civil and human rights 
2. Political Instability and Violence – measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, 
or changes in, government, including terrorism 
3. Government Effectiveness – measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and 
the quality of public service delivery 
4. Regulatory Burden – measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
5. Rule of Law – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
6. Control of Corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption and state capture 
 
Our estimates of governance are based on a large number of individual data 
sources which provide us with information on perceptions of governance.  These data 
sources consist of surveys of firms and individuals, as well as the assessments of 
commercial risk rating agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a number of 
multilateral aid agencies.   For this round of the governance indicators, we rely on a total 
of 352 individual variables measuring different dimensions of governance.  These are 
taken from 37 different sources, produced by 31 different organizations.  A full list of the 
data sources, as well as a detailed description of how individual perceptions measures 
are assigned to our six dimensions of governance, can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2005). 
 
 Our data sources reflect the views of a very diverse group of respondents.  
Several of our data sources are surveys of individuals or domestic firms with first-hand 
knowledge of the governance situation in the country.  These include the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, the Institute for Management 
Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, the World Bank’s business 
environment surveys, and a variety of global polls of individuals conducted by Gallup, 
Latinobarometro, and Afrobarometro.  We also capture the perceptions of country 
analysts at the major multilateral development agencies (the European Bank for 
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Reconstruction and Development, the African Development Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and the World Bank), 
reflecting these individuals’ in-depth experience working on the countries they assess.  
Other data sources from NGOs (such as Amnesty International, Reporters Without 
Borders, and Freedom House), as well as commercial risk rating agencies (such as EIU 
and DRI) base their assessments on a global network of correspondents typically living 
in the country they are rating. 
We combine the many individual data sources into six aggregate governance 
indicators.  The premise underlying this statistical approach should not be too 
controversial – each of the individual data sources we have provides an imperfect signal 
of some deep underlying notion of governance that is difficult to observe directly.  This 
means that as users of the individual sources, we face a signal-extraction problem – how 
do we isolate the informative signal about governance from each individual data source, 
and how do we optimally combine the many data sources to get the best possible signal 
of governance in a country based on all the available data?  We approach this question 
using a statistical method known as an unobserved components model, which allows us 
to extract the common dimension of unobserved governance from the many individual 
data sources at our disposal.  Details on this statistical approach can be found in 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005).  The main advantage of this approach is that 
the aggregate indicators are more informative about unobserved governance than any 
individual data source.  Moreover, the methodology allows us to be explicit about the 
precision – or imprecision – of our estimates of governance in each country.   As we 
discuss in more detail throughout this chapter, this imprecision is not a consequence of 
our reliance on subjective or perceptions data on governance – rather imprecision is an 
issue that should be squarely addressed in all efforts to measure the quality of 
governance.   
The full dataset of our aggregate governance indicators is available on the web 
at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/.  These indicators are constructed to 
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period.  Actual scores 
range from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.  In Figure 2 we provide a visual overview of the 
data for two dimensions of governance:  Political Stability and Absence of Violence, and 
Control of Corruption.   We order countries in ascending order according to their point 
estimates of governance in 2004 on the horizontal axis, and on the vertical axis we plot 
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the estimate of governance.  The vertical line for each country shows the statistically 
likely range for the value of governance for each country, as captured by a 90% 
confidence interval.  The size of these confidence intervals varies across countries, as 
different countries appear in different numbers of sources with different levels of 
precision. An important feature of this graph is that the confidence intervals are 
substantial relative to the units in which governance is measured.  As a result, many of 
the small differences in estimates of governance across countries are not likely to be 
statistically significant at reasonable confidence levels. For many applications, instead of 
merely observing the point estimates, it is more useful to focus on the range of possible 
governance values for each country. 
 
In Figure 3 we illustrate the changes over time in our estimates of governance in 
individual countries, for two selected governance indicators over the period 1996-2004.  
In both panels, we plot the 2004 score on the horizontal axis, and the 1996 score on the 
vertical axis. We also plot the 45-degree line, so that countries above this line 
correspond to declines in the quality of governance, while countries below the line 
correspond to improvements in governance.   The first feature of this graph is that most 
countries are clustered quite close to the 45-degree line, indicating that changes in our 
estimates of governance in these countries are relatively small over the eight-year period 
covered by the graph.  A similar pattern emerges for the other four dimensions of 
governance (not shown in Figure 3), and, not surprisingly the correlation between 
current and lagged estimates of governance is even higher when we consider shorter 
time periods. 
 
However, our estimates of governance do change substantially for some 
countries in some periods. In Figure 3 we have labeled those countries for which the 
change in estimated governance over the 1996-2004 period is sufficiently large that the 
90% confidence intervals for governance in the two periods do not overlap.  While not a 
formal test of statistical significance, we will show later in the paper that this is a useful 
rule of thumb for identifying statistically and practically important changes in governance.  
For example, from 1996 to 2004, countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Nepal and the 
Central African Republic show substantial declines in, among others, the Voice and 
Accountability measure, while countries like Argentina and Sierra Leone deteriorate on 
Regulatory Quality, and Zimbabwe, Cyprus, Israel, and Moldova decline on Control of 
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Corruption measures, contrasting countries like Latvia and Bahrain which show 
substantial improvements in Control of Corruption, while Croatia, Nigeria, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina improve in Voice and Accountability, for instance. 4   
 In the working paper version of this chapter (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2005) we have investigated in more detail the factors underlying the changes in our 
estimates of governance.  We find that for large changes in governance in either 
direction, there is a reassuringly high degree of consensus among our underlying data 
sources for each country as to the direction of the change.  For a typical large change in 
governance, over 80 percent of the data sources available for that country move in the 
same direction as the aggregate indicator.  Moreover, although the number of sources 
on which we draw for our governance indicators has increased sharply over time, we 
show that this addition of new sources does not appear to have very substantial effects 
on the changes over time in the governance estimates.   Taken together, this evidence 
suggests that for the large changes in governance shown in this table, we can have a 
good deal of confidence that it is mostly driven by changes in the underlying sources on 
which the aggregate indicators are based.  In contrast, we should be much more 
cautious in our interpretation of many of the smaller changes in our aggregate 
governance indicators. 
 
It is important to note that our aggregate indicators are measured in relative 
units, since we have scaled them to have a mean of zero in each period.  This opens the 
possibility that although many countries do not display large changes over time in their 
relative positions, it may be the case that there are broad-based improvements in global 
averages of governance that are not being picked up by our indicators.  In order to 
determine how important this concern is, we have gone back to our underlying data 
sources and selected a subset of them for which we can track over time a similar 
specific concept of governance for a common set of countries.   
 
                                                
4 Focusing on the shorter 1998-2004 period (yet one which has a larger country overlap) also 
yields a number of countries that have undergone large changes, such as the decline exhibited in 
Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law for West Bank/Gaza (for which 
there was no data in 1996), Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and Eritrea, and the deterioration in Voice 
and Accountability during the period in Nepal, Kyrgyz Republic, and Russia, contrasting the 
improvements in Control of Corruption in the Slovak Republic, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Madagascar and Colombia, or in Political Stability/Violence in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Angola, 
Turkey, South Africa and Senegal, for instance. 
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 In Table 1 we summarize trends in world averages in a number of our individual 
data sources.   Most of the sources in this table are polls of experts, with data extending 
over the whole period 1996-2004.  Only one of them, GCS, is a survey with sufficiently 
standard format to enable comparisons over this period of time.   The first five columns 
present the average across all countries of each of the sources in each of the years. The 
underlying data have been rescaled to run from zero to one, and for each source and 
governance component, we report the score on the same question or average of 
questions that we use in the aggregate indicator. The next five columns report the 
standard deviation across countries for each source. The final column reports the t-
statistic associated with a test of the null hypothesis that the world average score is the 
same in 1996 as in 2004.  
 
The picture that emerges from Table 1 is sobering.  There is very little evidence 
of statistically significant improvements in governance worldwide.  The 22 eight-year 
changes reported here are divided exactly in half into 11 improvements and 11 declines 
in global averages.  Interesting there are nine cases of statistically significant changes at 
the 10 percent level or better (t-statistics greater than 1.64 in absolute value), and these 
are split between three improvements and six declines.  It is not clear how much 
importance ought to be ascribed to these trends in world averages. On the one hand, 
these statistics represent the only information we have on trends over time, and so they 
should be taken seriously. On the other hand, it is also clear that there is substantial 
disagreement among sources about even the direction of changes in global averages of 
governance.   For now we cautiously conclude that we certainly do not have any 
evidence of any significant improvement in governance worldwide and, if anything, the 
evidence is suggestive of a deterioration at the very least in key dimensions such as 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.   
 
 
3.  Interpreting Differences in Governance Across Countries and Over Time 
 
 In our description of the data in the previous section we have emphasized the 
importance of measurement error our governance indicators.  In this section we first use 
the specific example of the eligibility criteria for the United States Millennium Challenge 
Account to illustrate the importance of margins of error for cross-country comparisons of 
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one dimension of governance:  corruption.  We also show how the presence of margins 
of error affects the conclusions we can draw about the statistical, and practical, 
importance of observed changes over time in governance.  
 
3.1  Cross-Country Governance Comparisons and the MCA 
 
As an illustration of the importance of margins of error in governance 
comparisons, consider the eligibility criteria for the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA).  Countries’ eligibility for grants from the MCA is determined by their relative 
positions on 16 different measures of country performance.  One of these is our Control 
of Corruption indicator, where countries are required to score above the median among 
all potentially eligible countries in order to qualify for MCA funding.  As we have noted 
elsewhere, this procedure risks misclassifying countries around the median because the 
margins of error for such countries often includes the median score.  In contrast, for 
countries near the top and the bottom of potential MCA beneficiaries, we can be quite 
confident that they do in fact fall above and below the median, respectively.   
 
Table 2 illustrates the role of margins of error in this calculation.  We focus 
attention on the set of 70 countries identified as potential MCA beneficiaries for the 2005 
fiscal year.5  For these countries, we calculate the median score on our Control of 
Corruption indicator for 2004.  Next, using our governance estimates and their 
accompanying standard errors, for each country we calculate the probability that the 
country’s level of corruption falls above the median for this group.  The results of this 
calculation are summarized in the first column of Table 2.  For 17 poorly-performing 
countries, or about one-quarter of the sample, there is less than a 10 percent chance 
that corruption in these countries actually falls above the median.  For another 23 
countries, or about a third of the sample, we are quite confident that corruption in these 
countries falls above the median, with a probability of at least 90 percent.  In contrast, for 
the remaining 30 countries, the probability that they fall above the median is somewhere 
between 10 percent and 90 percent, and so we have less confidence that these 
countries are correctly classified.  If we relax our standards of significance to 25 percent 
                                                
5 See http://www.mcc.gov/ for details on the MCA eligibility criteria. 
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and 75 percent, we find that only about 20 countries out of 70, or 29 percent of countries 
fall in this zone of uncertainty.6   
 
This example illustrates the importance of taking margins of error into account 
when making governance comparisons across countries.  Our aggregate governance 
indicator is able to identify with a fairly substantial degree of confidence groups of 
countries where the probability that corruption is above or below the median is large.  
But at the same time there remains an intermediate group of countries where we can be 
less confident that they are correctly classified as being “good” or “bad” performers 
based on their point estimates of governance alone.   
 
It is also important to note how this example illustrates the benefit of aggregating 
many sources of data on corruption, as we do.  The remaining columns of Table 2 
perform the same calculations, but relying on successively less precise measures of 
governance.  The second and third columns use our own Control of Corruption 
indicators for 2000 and 1996.  These indicators cover fewer countries, and because they 
rely on a smaller set of sources available at the time, the margins of error for individual 
countries are higher than in 2004 (see the standard errors reported in the last row).  In 
1996, for example, 35 percent of the countries for which data is available fall in the 
intermediate category where the probability that they fall in the top half of the sample is 
between 25 percent and 75 percent – as opposed to only 29 percent of countries falling 
in this grey area with the 2004 indicator.  The last three columns of the table show the 
same information for three of our individual sources, WMO, DRI, and GCS.  These 
individual sources have substantially higher margins of error than our aggregate 
indicators, and in the case of DRI and GCS also cover substantially fewer countries.  In 
addition, we see that there is greater uncertainty about country rankings when relying on 
just a single indicator:  for GCS, for example, the fraction of countries falling in the 
intermediate category rises to 40 percent.  This illustrates the benefit of relying on 
aggregate indicators which are more informative than individual indicators when trying to 
classify countries according to their levels of governance. 
                                                
6 We first performed these MCA-related calculations in late 2002, shortly after the announcement 
of the initial MCA eligibility criteria.  At that time, using the older version of our 2000 Control of 
Corruption indicator, we found that 23 out of 61 countries (or 38 percent of countries) fell in this 
intermediate zone.  This much higher proportion of intermediate countries reflected the fact that 
the old version of or 2000 Control of Corruption indicator relied on substantially fewer data 
sources than we now have available to us for both 2000 and 2004. 
 12
 
3.2  Margins of Error and Changes over Time in Governance 
  
 It is useful to begin our discussion with the simplest possible example of how 
measurement error impacts our interpretation of changes over time in observed 
governance indicators, both subjective and objective.   Suppose that we have only one 
source of governance data observed at two points in time, and we want to make 
inferences about how governance has changed in a country.  To keep notation as simple 
as possible, we suppress country subscripts and write the observed data at time t, y(t), 
as the sum of true unobserved governance in that period, g(t), and an error term 
capturing measurement error: 
 
(1) 2,1t,)t()t(g)t(y =ε+=  
 
As a choice of units, we assume that true governance has mean zero and standard 
deviation one, and that the error term has zero mean.  For simplicity we assume that the 
variance of the error term is the same in both periods and is equal to σ2.  Note that σ2 is 
the noise-to-signal ratio in the observed governance data (the ratio of the variance of the 
error to the variance of unobserved governance).  We also allow for the possibility that 
both governance and the error term are correlated over time, with correlations ρ and r, 
respectively.  Finally we assume that both governance and the error term are normally 
distributed.  With these simplifying assumptions, consider the problem of making 
inferences about the change in unobserved governance, g(t)-g(t-1), conditional on 
observing data y(t) and y(t-1) in the two periods.  Using the fact that unobserved 
governance and the data are jointly normally distributed, we can use the properties of 
the multivariate normal distribution to arrive at the following expressions for the mean 
and variance of the change in governance, conditional on the observed data:7 
 
(2) 
[ ] ( ) ( )ρ−−⋅σ+
−−⋅ρ−=−−−
)r1(1
)1t(y)t(y1)1t(y),t(y|)1t(g)t(gE 2  
[ ] ( ) ( ) ρ−−⋅σ+
σ⋅−⋅ρ−⋅=−−−
)r1(1
r112)1t(y),t(y|)1t(g)t(gV 2
2
 
                                                
7 The simple example here is a special case of a more general model we discuss below. 
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It is natural to use this conditional mean as our best estimate of the change in 
governance, and the conditional variance as an indicator of the confidence we have in 
the estimate.  This is in fact exactly analogous to how we obtain estimates of levels of 
governance and associated standard errors using the unobserved components model.   
 
To interpret these expressions, consider first the case where there is no 
persistence in governance or in the error terms, i.e. ρ=r=0.  In this case, our estimate of 
the change in governance is simply 21
)1t(y)t(y
σ+
−− .  In particular, we should take the 
observed change in the single source and scale it down by a factor of 21
1
σ+  to reflect 
the fact that the data measures governance with error.  It is also clear from Equation (2) 
that the higher is ρ, the more we should discount observed changes in governance.  
Intuitively, if we knew that governance changes very slowly over time, then any observed 
change in the data is more likely to reflect changes in the error term, and so we should 
discount this observed change more heavily.  In the limit where governance is perfectly 
correlated in the two periods, we would know for sure that any change observed in the 
data must reflect only fluctuations in the error term, and so we would completely 
discount the observed change in the data.  That is, our estimate of the change in 
governance would be zero regardless of the observed change in the data. 
 
The effect of persistence in the error terms works in the opposite direction:  we 
should scale down the observed change in the data by less the larger is the correlation 
over time in the error terms.  Again the intuition for this is simple – if we know that the 
error with which a given source measures governance is persistent over time, then any 
observed change in the source is likely to understate the true change in unobserved 
governance.  As a result our best estimate of the change in governance will be larger 
than the observed change in the data.  Interestingly, if the correlation in unobserved 
governance and the error term are equal to each other, i.e. ρ=r, then these two effects 
offset exactly and the discount applied to the observed change in governance is 21
1
σ+ . 
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 How much confidence should we have in the statistical significance of the 
change in unobserved governance based on the observed data?  Suppose that we 
observe a change in the indicator equal to k standard deviations of the changes in this 
variable, i.e. ( )ρ−−⋅σ+⋅⋅=−− )r1(12k)1t(y)t(y 2 .  Does this signal a significant 
change in governance?  In order to test the null hypothesis that the change in 
governance is zero, we can construct the usual z-statistic associated with this 
hypothesis, i.e. the ratio of the mean of the change in governance conditional on the 
data to the square root of the conditional variance, which simplifies to: 
 
(3) 
[ ]
[ ] r1
1k
)1t(y),t(y|)1t(g)t(gV
)1t(y),t(y|)1t(g)t(gEz −
ρ−⋅σ=−−−
−−−=  
 
Not surprisingly, the observed change in the data is more likely to signal a significant 
change in unobserved governance the larger is the observed change in the data (i.e. the 
larger is k), and the lower is the signal-to-noise ratio in the data (i.e. the smaller is σ).  
And building on the intuitions above, the observed change in the data is also more likely 
to signal a significant change in unobserved governance the lower is the persistence in 
unobserved governance, ρ, and the higher is the persistence in the error term, r. 
 
 Figure 4 puts some numbers to this simple calculation.  We graph the number of 
standard deviations of the observed change in the data, k, on the horizontal axis, and we 
plot the z-statistic in Equation (3) on the vertical axis for different values of the key 
parameters.  We set σ2=0.36, as this is the median value for the noise-to-signal ratio 
across all of the individual data sources we use to construct our six governance 
indicators in each of the five periods.  In an earlier paper we have argued that the noise-
to-signal ratio in objective measures of governance is likely to be at least as large as 
this.8  The thin upward-sloping line traces out the z-statistic as a function of k for this 
value of the noise-to-signal ratio, but assuming that the correlation in governance and 
the error term are zero, i.e. ρ=r=0.  The z-statistic is greater than the 90-percent critical 
value for changes in the observed data that are more than one standard deviation away 
from the mean change.  This suggests that if there is no persistence in governance or in 
the error terms, quite a large proportion of observed changes in individual governance 
                                                
8 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004) 
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indicators would in fact signal a significant change in unobserved governance.  In fact, if 
changes in the observed governance indicator are approximately normally distributed, 
the largest one-third of all absolute changes would signal changes in governance that 
are significant at the 90% level. 
 
 The bold upward-sloping line corresponds to the more empirically relevant case 
where there is persistence in both governance and the error terms.  The line is drawn for 
the same noise-to-signal ratio as before, and in addition we assume that the correlation 
of unobserved governance over time is ρ=0.9 and the correlation in the error term is 
r=0.4.  In the next subsection we show how these parameters can be estimated using 
our governance data, and find that these values are typical ones.  In particular, we shall 
see shortly that unobserved governance tends to be highly persistent over the eight-year 
period spanned by our dataset, and although the error terms are also typically positively 
correlated over time they are much less so than governance.  Based on the intuitions 
developed above, this suggests that much larger observed changes in governance 
indicators would be required to signal statistically significant changes in unobserved 
governance.  This is exactly what we find.  The bold line crosses the 90% critical value 
at k=2.5, indicating that only those observed changes in the data more than 2.5 standard 
deviations away from the mean would signal a statistically significant change in 
governance.  Again, if changes in the observed governance indicators are normally 
distributed, this would imply that only the top one percent of all absolute changes would 
correspond to significant changes in governance.  This in turn suggests that drawing 
conclusions about changes in governance based on changes in individual governance 
indicators should be done with an abundance of caution. 
 
 In the appendix to this chapter we extend the discussion above to the case of 
aggregate governance indicators.  The basic insights from this discussion of changes in 
individual indicators also carry over to changes in aggregate governance indicators.  
Just as we found that aggregate indicators are more informative about levels of 
governance than individual indicators, so changes over time in aggregate indicators can 
be more informative about trends in governance than changes in individual indicators.  
And as suggested in the discussion above, there is a tension between persistence in 
governance and persistence in measurement error in the aggregate indicators.  The 
greater is the former, the more cautious we should be about observed changes in 
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governance.  And the greater is the latter, the more likely it is that observed changes in 
indicators of governance signal significant changes in true governance.  As shown in the 
appendix, we find that that the simple rule of thumb we proposed in Section 2 of the 
paper -- that changes in governance are significant if the 90 percent (or 75 percent) 
confidence intervals in the two periods do not overlap -- does a fairly good job of 
identifying changes that are statistically significant using more formal criteria. 
  
4. Subjective and Objective Measures of Governance 
 
 In this section of the paper we address a number of issues that arise in using 
subjective or perceptions-based data to measure governance across countries.  We 
begin by discussing why subjective data is often either the only type of data available to 
measure governance, or else adds valuable insights over available objective measures.  
We next emphasize that margins of error are not unique to the subjective measures of 
governance that we construct, but are pervasive in all efforts to measure governance.  
We present some simple calculations which show that margins of error in objective 
measures of governance are comparable to those we present for our subjective 
measures.  We then turn to a deeper investigation of one source of discrepancy between 
subjective and objective indicators, which is that the latter tend to emphasize de jure 
rules on the books while the former tend to pick up the de facto reality on the ground.  
We finally briefly describe an earlier effort of ours to quantify the importance of 
ideological biases in subjective measures of governance and found that they were small. 
 
4.1  Perceptions Matter 
 
 In this subsection we discuss some of the advantages of the subjective or 
perceptions-based measures of governance we use to construct our aggregate 
governance indicators.  The primary reason for this choice is that for many of the key 
dimensions of governance, such as corruption or the confidence that property rights are 
protected, relevant objective data are almost by definition impossible to obtain, and so 
there are few alternatives to the subjective data on which we rely.   
 
Consider for example corruption.  Since corruption is by nature an illegal activity, 
direct measures of its prevalence do not exist.  A variety of indirect measures are 
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possible, but none are without difficulty.  For example, relying on the frequency of 
references to corruption in the media will reflect not only the prevalence of corruption, 
but also the extent to which the press are free and objective in their coverage of events.  
Similarly, relying on prosecutions or conviction rates in corruption trials will to no small 
extent reflect the competence and independence of the police and judicial system, and 
thus will not exclusively reflect the prevalence of corruption itself.  Finally, in recent years 
a handful of papers have attempted to measure corruption by looking for patterns in 
objective data that can only be consistent with corruption.  For example, DiTella and 
Shargrodsky (2003) document variation in the procurement prices paid for very 
homogenous medical inputs such as syringes across hospitals in Buenos Aires as an 
indicator of corruption in procurement.  Along similar lines, Golden and Picci (2003) 
carefully document variation in the differences between existing stocks of public 
infrastructure and past flows of infrastructure spending across Italian regions, 
interpreting this gap as a measure of procurement corruption.  While these last two 
papers represent important and interesting developments in measurement, cross-
country measures of corruption based on this idea are not available – nor are they likely 
to be, given the major data requirements for this kind of exercise.  
 
For some other dimensions of governance, objective measures may be available, 
but nevertheless suffer from two related weaknesses.  For Voice and Accountability, for 
example, it is possible to use objective data on the presence of elections to measure 
democratic participation.  However, as is well known there is a great deal of variation 
across countries in the extent to which the outcome of elections actually reflect the will of 
the voters.  Measuring the extent to which elections are subverted, either through 
intimidation, manipulation, or sheer fabrication of results, brings us quickly back to the 
realm of more subjective or perceptions-based data.  This is just one example of the 
important distinction between de jure and de facto situations regarding governance 
across countries.  Countries may have extensive formal protections of property rights 
codified in their legal system that are honored only in the breach.  For example, most 
countries in the world now have formal independent anti-corruption commissions, but 
their effectiveness varies greatly.   
 
More generally, subjective perceptions of governance often matter as much as 
the legal reality.  For example, on the basis of firm's perceptions on the undue influence 
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on the political decision-making process exerted by powerful firms, influencing laws, 
policies and regulations, Hellman and Kaufmann (2003) develop a measure for 'crony 
bias' or unequal influence across firms.  The authors find a consistent pattern in which 
perceived unequal influence has strongly negative impact on the firm's assessment of 
public institutions, which in turn affects the behavior of the firm towards those 
institutions.  Crony bias at both the firm and the country level is associated with lesser 
use of the courts by the firms to resolve business disputes, with lower enforceability of 
court decisions, lower levels of tax compliance, and higher levels of bribery.  Thus, the 
evidence suggests that the inequality of influence not only damages the credibility of 
institutions among less (politically) powerful firms, but affects the likelihood that they will 
use and provide tax resources to support such institutions, thereby perpetuating the 
weakness of such institutions and likelihood of capture by the influential.  
 
Finally, in recent years the economics and comparative political economy 
literature has generated a profusion of results linking a variety of objective measures of 
the structure of institutions to a range of governance outcomes.  A non-exhaustive list of 
examples includes the links between decentralization and corruption; the effects of the 
structure of the legal system on financial market development; the effect of checks and 
balances in the political system on regulatory and fiscal performance; the effects of 
democratic institutions on a wide range of socioeconomic outcomes; and many others.  
While this literature has served to greatly expand our understanding of the deep 
institutional determinants of development, the objective measures of institutional quality 
and/or their historical determinants on which they rely do not lend themselves well to the 
construction of aggregate governance indicators like ours.  The basic reason is that 
these indicators typically do not have normative content on their own, but only do so in 
the context of a particular empirical analysis linking these variables with a particular 
outcome.  For example, while measures of decentralization may be correlated with the 
incidence of corruption across countries, generally the explanatory power of this variable 
is not sufficiently strong that decentralization could be considered to be a reasonable 
proxy for corruption.  
 
None of this is to suggest that the subjective data on which we rely are problem-
free.  We have already discussed the relative strengths and weaknesses of polls of 
experts and stakeholder surveys in measuring governance.  Beyond this, a generic 
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problem with many perceptions-based questions about governance is that they can be 
vague and open to interpretation.  For example, a well crafted question to enterprises on 
corruption asks them for the estimated share of bribes in revenues expended annually 
by firms like theirs, and similarly another focused ‘experiential’ question probes into the 
percentage of the firm’s management time spent dealing with government officials on 
red tape.  By contrast, generalized opinion questions such as a citizen’s perception of 
the overall tolerance of the population to corruption are less informative for our 
purposes.  Nowadays we can increasingly rely on more specific, better crafted, and to an 
extent experiential questions, thanks to improvements that have taken place over time.  
For instance, in contrast with the mid-nineties, the GCS survey of firms contains much 
more specific questions to the firm about corruption and governance, and some are of a 
quantitative and experiential nature (such as percentage of senior management time 
spent with public officials); similarly BPS includes many detailed questions unbundling 
governance to very specific components, and quantifying phenomena such as the 
percentage of bribes paid yearly as a share of revenues.     
 
4.2 Margins of Error Are Not Unique to Subjective Data 
 
 We have argued that one of the strengths of the governance indicators reported 
in this paper is that we are able to construct explicit margins of error associated with our 
estimates of governance for each country.  However it is worth emphasizing that these 
margins of error are not unique to subjective or perceptions-based measures of 
governance, but are also present -- if not explicitly noted -- in most other measures of 
institutional quality, or any other socioeconomic indicator for that matter.  One need only 
consider the range of “preliminary” estimates of basic objective variables such as real 
GDP growth produced in industrial countries with high-quality statistical systems to 
realize that measurement error in objective data is in fact pervasive and should be taken 
seriously.9   
 
Consider for example the recent interest in constructing objective measures of 
governance that do not exclusively rely on perceptions-based data sources as we do, 
but rather on objective and quantifiable data.  Several of these are described in Knack 
                                                
9 The discussion in this subsection is taken from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004).  The 
calculations involving the governance indicators here are based on the 2002 indicators that were 
the latest available at that time. 
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and Kugler (2002).  They argue that variables such as the waiting time required to obtain 
a telephone line, and the number of telephone faults can serve as proxies for public 
administrative capacity.   The reliance of the government on trade taxes can serve as a 
proxy for the (in)ability of the government to broaden its tax base.  The volatility in 
budgetary expenditure shares, and similarly, the volatility of revenue shares, is indicative 
of a volatile and unpredictable policy environment.  They also draw on a number of other 
measures of institutional quality pre-existing in the literature.  Clague, Keefer, Knack and 
Olson (1996) argue that the fraction of currency in circulation that is held in the banking 
system is a good proxy of the extent to which individuals in a country can be confident 
that their property rights are protected.  Finally, in a series of papers, Djankov et al 
(2002, 2003) compile cross-country data on the number of administrative procedures 
required to start a business, and the number of legal procedures required to collect an 
unpaid debt.  These measures capture the complexity of the regulatory and legal 
environment. 
 
While most of these measures can in principle provide an accurate measure of 
the specific underlying concept to which they refer, their usefulness as a measure of 
broader notions of governance depends on the extent to which the specific concept they 
are measuring corresponds to these broader ideas of governance.  For example, the 
number of procedures required to start a business may not be a good indicator of the 
complexity or burden of regulation in other areas.  Similarly, the willingness of individuals 
to hold currency in banks reflect their confidence in a very particular set of property 
rights (vis-à-vis banks, and banks vis-à-vis the government), but may not necessarily 
capture other dimensions of property rights protection, such as confidence in the police 
and judicial system to uphold private property rights.   
 
This is of course not surprising, nor should it be considered a drawback of such 
measures -- all of which necessarily are imperfect proxies for broader notions of 
governance.  However, it does mean that one should consider seriously the margins of 
error for objective indicators as well, to the extent that these are used as proxies for 
broad concepts of governance such as the ones we measure using subjective data in 
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this paper.10  While these margins of error are generally not made explicit for objective 
indicators, a simple calculation can give a sense of their order of magnitude.  Suppose 
that we have two noisy indicators y on a common unobserved concept of governance, g, 
i.e.: ii gy ε+= , i=1,2.  Then if we normalize the variance of the unobserved measure of 
governance  to be one, the correlation between the two observed indicators will be 
( ) ( )( ) 2/12221 11 −σ+⋅σ+=ρ .   Suppose that indicator 1 is one of our subjective governance 
indicators, for which the variance of the measurement error, 21σ , is known, and that 
indicator 2 is one of the objective indicators described above.  Then from the observed 
correlation between the two indicators, we can infer the variance of measurement error 
in the objective indicator, 22σ . 
 
The results of this calculation can be found in Table 3.  The rows of Table 3 
correspond to the various objective governance indicators discussed above.  In the first 
two columns, we identify the objective indicator, and the subjective aggregate 
governance indicator which best corresponds to it.  In the third column we report the 
correlation between the subjective and the objective indicator, using our 2002 
governance indicators.  The next three columns report the implied standard deviation of 
measurement error in the objective indicator, under three assumptions:  (A) that our 
estimate of the standard deviation of measurement error in the subjective indicator is 
correct, (B) that the subjective and objective indicators have the same standard 
deviation of measurement error, and (C) that the standard deviation of measurement 
error in the subjective indicator is twice as large as that in the objective indicator.  Finally 
in the last column we report the actual standard deviation of measurement error, 
computed as the average across all countries of the country-specific standard errors in 
our governance indicators. 
 
 The results in Table 3 are quite striking.  For all indicators, and for all three sets 
of assumptions, the implied standard deviation of measurement error in the objective 
indicators is very high relative to the corresponding standard deviation of the subjective 
governance indicators.  Under the benchmark assumption (A) which takes seriously the 
                                                
10 These margins of error should of course also reflect measurement error in the raw data on 
which they are based -- for example, the non-trivial measurement error in macroeconomic 
variables such as the money supply or the composition of public expenditures. 
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margins of error we have computed for our governance indicators, we find that the 
implied margin of error for the objective indicators is between seven and 15  times larger 
than that of the subjective indicators.  This clearly exaggerates the difference in the 
precision of subjective and objective indicators because we are comparing a single 
objective indicator with an aggregate of several subjective measures, and as discussed 
we should expect aggregation to improve precision.   But this is only part of the story.  
For the GE and RQ indicators, we have a median of six sources per country, while for 
RL we have a median of eight sources.  This can explain why the standard deviation of 
measurement error of the objective sources might be 4.26 =  to 8.28 =  times higher 
than that of the corresponding subjective indicators, but still cannot explain all of the 
difference in the precision of the indicators that we see.  Similarly, the last row in Table 3 
reports the correlation of GE with an aggregate of all the objective indicators.  In this 
case, the benefits of aggregation would be roughly comparable for the two indicators, 
with a median of 5 sources per country for the objective indicator and a median of 6 
sources per country for GE.  Nevertheless, we find that the implied standard deviation of 
measurement error is still four times as large for the objective indicator as it is for the 
subjective one.  
 
 Assumptions (B) and (C) are designed to be more favorable to the precision of 
the objective indicators.  Assumption (B) discards the information in the margins of error 
that we have constructed for the subjective indicator, and simply makes the neutral 
assumption that the subjective and the objective indicators have the same standard 
deviation of measurement error.  This reduces the implied standard deviation of 
measurement error for the objective indicator relative to the benchmark assumption (A), 
but it remains large at 0.6 for the composite objective indicator, and higher for the 
individual indicators.  Assumption (C) weights things even further in favor of the objective 
indicators, assuming that the objective indicator is twice as precise as the subjective 
indicator.  In this case, we continue to find very substantial estimates of the standard 
deviation of measurement error, on the order of 0.4 and higher for individual objective 
indicators.   
 
 This simple calculation underscores and helps to quantify the intuitive notion that 
all governance indicators, not just the subjective ones we have constructed, are subject 
to non-trivial margins of error, and that care should be taken in making governance 
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comparisons based on any such measures.  In addition, wherever possible, it is 
desirable to construct explicit margins of error to aid in these comparisons. 
 
4.3  De Jure and De Facto Governance Indicators 
A recurrent theme in this paper is that individual sources of governance data are 
imperfect and provide only noisy signals of unobserved governance.  In the previous 
subsection we have seen that part of this measurement error is due to the fact that all 
specific subjective and objective measures of governance are imperfect proxies for the 
broader concepts of governance that they are used to measure.  In this section we turn 
to a different source of measurement error, arising from the distinction between de jure 
and de facto measures of governance.  Consider for example the very useful “Doing 
Business” project of the World Bank, which has compiled objective measures of various 
dimensions of the regulatory environment across countries, by interviewing law firms 
around the world about formal rules and regulations in their countries.  As with the 
subjective measures of ease of business entry, there are gaps between this specific 
dimension of regulation and the overall quality of the regulatory environment.  
Interestingly, we show next that there are systematic differences between even very 
specific subjective and objective measures, which reflect the sometimes-wide gap 
between the de jure rules on the books, and their de facto application.   
 
We consider two measures of the de facto environment facing firms, taken from 
the survey of over 8000 firms in 104 countries carried out by the World Economic Forum 
in 2004 as an input to their Global Competitive Report.  These two variables capture 
firms’ assessment of the ease of starting a business, as well as their reported tax 
burden. 11  We match these with two closely-related de jure measures from other 
sources.  For ease of starting a business, we draw on the Doing Business project at the 
World Bank discussed above.  From this dataset we take the number of days required to 
start a business.  For perceptions of the tax burden, we have independently collected 
statutory tax rates for the sampled countries, and within it, for the types of firms by 
                                                
11 For the past number of years, collaboration between WBI and the WEF has resulted in an in-
depth coverage of governance in the survey, and in the WBI contribution of a governance chapter 
for each GCR.  For details on the data we use for the text described above, and the related 
coverage of these governance issues at the micro-level, see the Governance chapter in the GCR 
2004, at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/gcr2004.html. 
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sector, and mapped these rates into the firm level data.  We then aggregate these up to 
the country level to obtain average measures of the statutory tax burden.12   
We begin with simple ordinary least squares regressions of perceptions of ease 
of starting a business on the corresponding objective measure (first column of Table 4).  
Not surprisingly, the objective measure enters negatively and is highly statistically 
significant with a t-statistic of more than five, indicating that firms perceive it more difficult 
to start a business in countries where the number of days required to do so is large.  
More interesting for our purposes is the observation that the R-squared of the regression 
is very modest, at only 0.23.   
 
We cannot say at this point whether this reflects measurement error in the 
subjective or the objective measure, as either one would contribute to a low R-squared.  
One hypothesis however is that the objective measure fails to capture the extent to 
which the formal requirements to start a business are altered by the presence of 
corruption or other forms of informality in their application.  To investigate this possibility 
we add our aggregate measure of Control of Corruption to the regression.13  We find that 
this variable enters positively and highly significantly, indicating that perceptions of the 
ease of starting a business are significantly better in countries with less corruption, even 
after controlling for the de jure rules governing business entry.  Once we add corruption, 
the coefficient on the de jure rules falls by half, and its significance also drops to the 10 
percent level.  Moreover the adjusted R-squared of the regression doubles to 0.44, 
indicating substantial explanatory power for this additional variable. 
 
There is however an obvious difficulty with this result.  It could well be the case 
that firms’ responses to the question regarding business entry are non-specific, in the 
sense that they will provide low responses if their assessment of the overall business 
environment is negative.  This generalized dissatisfaction could account for the 
significance of the corruption variable, rather than the extent to which business entry 
                                                
12 The main source for the effective tax rates was the PricewaterhouseCoopers report “Corporate 
taxes: worldwide summaries (2003-2004)”, covering 85 of our sample of 104 countries. As some 
countries have differential tax rates, to map the country-level data from the report to the individual 
firm-level data from the GCS we used, in addition to country criterion, individual characteristics 
such as size, sector, and whether the firm exports or not. For those countries for which the report 
has no information we used the country average calculated by KPMG in their “Corporate tax rate 
survey”. 
13 Recognizing that the dependent variable is one of many individual data sources entering in the 
regression, we lag the corruption measure and use the 2002 version. 
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procedures are tainted by corruption.  We address this possibility in the next three 
columns.  One test for this problem of non-specificity is to ask whether unrelated 
objective measures of the business environment also predict perceptions about ease of 
entry.  We do this in the third column by adding the objective tax burden question to the 
regression.  If firm responses reflect generalized dissatisfaction, we might expect this 
variable also to enter significantly, yet it does not.  In the fourth column we instead add 
firms’ responses to a question about the overall regulatory environment that they face.  
Again we find that corruption remains highly significant, and in this case the general 
question about regulation is also highly significant.  This suggests that while non-
specificity of responses may be a concern, it does not fully account for the significance 
of the corruption measure in the previous specifications.  Interestingly, in both 
specifications, we find that the coefficient on the objective entry measure becomes larger 
and more significant as we add these control variables.  Finally we note that all these 
results go through when we put all four variables in the regression. 
 
 The second and third panels of Table 4 reveal interesting differences between 
developing countries on the one hand, and OECD and newly-industrialized countries, on 
the other.  In the developing country sample, the results described above go through for 
the most part.  However, it is interesting to note that the magnitude and significance of 
the objective measure is in general smaller in the developing country sample, and larger 
in the industrial country sample, while the converse is true for the corruption variable.  
Taken together these results suggest that firm perceptions of the ease of starting a 
business depend on both de jure rules, as well as the institutional environment in which 
those rules are applied.  Moreover, the relative importance of de jure rules seems to be 
higher in industrial than in developing countries.  More broadly, the lesson from this 
simple exercise is that it can be misleading to rely exclusively on either perceptions of de 
facto governance or objective measures of the de jure rules. 
 
 We perform the same sequence of regressions using the question on 
perceptions of tax burdens from GCS as the dependent variable.  The results are 
broadly similar to those discussed above, and are reported in the continuation of Table 
4.  In the full sample of countries, we find that perceptions of tax burdens are strongly 
correlated with our de jure measure of statutory tax rates.  While in the full sample of 
countries we do not find corruption to enter significantly, it does in the developing 
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country sample where we might expect corruption to matter more for perceptions of the 
tax burden.  As before, we address the possibility that the tax burden question captures 
generalized dissatisfaction rather than a specific concern with taxation by including the 
objective measure of days to start a business, and we find that the corruption variable 
remains significant.  Also consistent with our priors, we find that differences in statutory 
tax rates have much stronger explanatory power for perceptions of tax burden in the 
industrial country sample.  While the overall results are not quite as strong as for the 
business entry example discussed above, qualitatively the picture that emerges is quite 
similar. 
 
In sum, the results suggest that assessments of governance should not be based 
solely on objective measures of the de jure situation.  We have seen that firms’ 
perceptions of the ease of starting a business, and the weight of their tax burden, 
depend not only on the de jure regulations that they face, but also on the environment in 
which these regulations are applied.  Many laws and regulations are often adopted, yet 
implementation is subverted due to the many informal mechanisms that often prevail.  In 
these settings frequently the essence of how policies and regulations are actually 
implemented may be missed by objective indicators.  This is not to say, of course, that 
firm-based surveys of perceptions are devoid of margins of error and related challenges.  
Rather, the results we have shown emphasize the importance of relying on a range of 
measures to assess governance, and on recognizing that no single measure is a perfect 
proxy for governance.   
 
4.4 Potential Ideological Biases 
 
We conclude this section by briefly addressing the critique that subjective data 
from polls of experts may reflect the ideological tendencies of the institutions compiling 
the performance ratings.  Our assumption has been that this is not a major concern for 
the sources on which we rely.  This is because we find a very high degree of correlation 
among most of our sources, which is difficult to reconcile with a systematic ideological 
bias present in certain sources.  In a previous paper (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2004)) we nevertheless took this possibility seriously and investigated the extent to 
which the differences in assessments across sources are related to observable 
measures of the ideology of the government in power in each country.  
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We did this as follows.  Our identifying assumption was that surveys of firms or 
individuals are not tainted by ideology, since they reflect the views of a large number of 
respondents in each country.  In contrast, it is possible that the views of a smaller 
number of raters affiliated with a particular institution may reflect the ideology of that 
group.  We can therefore identify the effects of ideology by looking at the correlation 
across countries between the ideology of the government in power, and the difference in 
the percentile ranks assigned to countries by a poll of experts and a survey of individuals 
and firms.  We implemented this idea using the World Bank’s Business Environment 
Survey (WBS) for 2000, and an independently available indicator variable that takes on 
the value 1 if the government in power is left-of-center, 2 if it is center, and 3 if it is right-
of-center, taken from the database of political institutions constructed by Beck et. al. 
(2001).  The coefficient on the ideology variable was intended to capture the extent to 
which a given poll of experts rates countries with left- or right-wing governments 
systematically differently from a survey. 
 
The results of the regressions confirm that most sources are not affected by 
ideological bias.  Only one source, Heritage Foundation, was found to assign relatively 
higher scores to countries with right-of-center governments than the corresponding 
surveys.  However, it is worth emphasizing that this “ideology bias” is fairly modest in 
magnitude.  The coefficient estimates indeed indicate that a country with a right-of-
center government would get between 7 and 10 percentile points higher than a center 
government.  Moreover, in all cases, the ideology variable in a statistical sense explains 
only a trivial fraction of the difference in assessments between polls and surveys, 
suggesting that the importance of ideological biases in polls is quite small overall14. 
 
  
5.  Interpreting Governance-Income Correlations 
 
 We began this chapter by noting the strong consensus that governance matters 
for economic development.  In important part of the evidence in support of this view 
comes from providing a causal interpretation of the strong observed positive correlation 
                                                
14 See Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 for a more thorough 
discussion and for presentation of regressions results. 
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between governance and per capita incomes across countries.  But there are alternative 
interpretations of this correlation.   We first consider – and discount – the interpretation 
that these strong correlations are a consequence of “halo effects”, i.e. an upward bias in 
perceptions of governance in rich countries simply because they are rich.  We also 
discuss – and refute – the argument that the weak governance performance of countries 
in Africa should be discounted in some sense because these countries are poor. 
 
 
5.1  Halo Effects 
 
 Perceptions-based measures of governance such as the ones we develop here 
are potentially subject to a number of biases.  One common critique is that perceptions 
of governance are biased upwards in rich countries because respondents view the 
development success of the country in question as evidence that institutional quality is 
good.  This type of bias is sometimes referred to as a “halo effect”.15  This in turn implies 
that part of the observed high correlation between per capita incomes and governance 
spuriously reflects this bias.   
 
 To formalize the idea of halo effects, suppose that we can write our observed 
estimates of governance, g*, as the sum of true governance, g, and an error term, u: 
 
(4) ug*g +=  
 
The essence of the halo effect argument is that this error term u is correlated with per 
capita incomes, y.  The relevant question then is the extent to which this spurious 
correlation can account for the high observed correlation between measured governance 
and per capita incomes.  Intuitively, it should be clear that in order for halo effects to 
substantially account for the correlation between incomes and measured governance, it 
must be the case that the correlation between the error and income is large.  Perhaps 
less obviously, it must also be the case that the variance of the error term is large 
relative to the variation in governance.  Otherwise, even if the error term is strongly 
                                                
15 A recent statement of this critique can be found in Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2004), who assert that much of the correlation between subjective measures of 
governance and levels of development is attributable to this type of bias. 
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correlated with income, the fact that it accounts for little of the variance in measured 
governance means that it will have little impact on the correlation between measured 
governance and per capita income.  Our argument in a nutshell is that for reasonable 
assumptions on the importance of measurement error, this measurement error would 
have to be implausibly highly correlated with per capita incomes in order to constitute a 
significant source of bias. 
 
To formalize this intuition, we decompose the observed correlation between 
measured governance and per capita income into a term reflecting the true correlation 
between governance and income, and a term attributable to the halo effect: 
 
(5) )y,u(CORRs)y,g(CORRs1)y*,g(CORR ⋅+⋅−=  
 
where *]g[V/]u[Vs=  is a measure of how noisy the governance indicator is.  Note also 
that the correlation between measured governance and per capita income that we see in 
the data is around 0.8. 
 
 To understand this expression, suppose that the true correlation between 
governance and income were zero, so that all of the observed correlation between 
income and governance is due to the second term capturing halo effects.  This consists 
of two ingredients:  the actual correlation of the error term with per capita income, which 
is multiplied by the square root of the share of the variance in governance due to the 
error term.  Suppose that the governance indicator is very noisy so that the share of the 
variance approaches one.  Then the correlation of the error term with per capita income 
must be equal to the observed correlation in the data.  Suppose however that the 
governance indicator is at least somewhat informative, so that s is less than one.  Then 
in order to match the observed correlation in the data, the halo effect correlation in the 
error term must be even larger than the 0.8 observed in the data.  This example 
illustrates how the importance of halo effects in accounting for the observed correlation 
between governance and per capita income depends on both the strength of the halo 
effect itself, as well as the relative importance of measurement error in the governance 
indicator.  
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 This example is extreme because we have assumed that the true correlation 
between governance and income is zero.  We now relax this assumption and revisit the 
question of how strong halo effects need to be to account for the observed correlation 
between measured governance and per capita income of 0.8.  We do this with the help 
of Figure 6, which graphs the strength of the halo effect, i.e. CORR[u,y], on the vertical 
axis, against the share of the variance in governance due to the residual, i.e. s, on the 
horizontal axis.  The different lines on the graph correspond to different assumptions for 
the true correlation between governance and income.  We have already discussed the 
intuition for the case where this correlation is zero, shown as the highest line in the 
graph.  When the share of the variance in governance due to measurement error is one, 
the halo effect correlation must be equal to 0.8.  As we move to the left and the 
governance indicator becomes more informative, the required correlation increases.  
 
 The lines corresponding to successively higher true correlations between 
governance and income fall everywhere below the first series.  This is because once we 
allow for some correlation between true governance and income, the halo effect needed 
to account for the correlation between observed governance and income is weaker.  
Interestingly, however, even if the true correlation is quite substantial at 0.6, the lowest 
line in Figure 6 tells us that halo effects must still be quite considerable, with a 
correlation of at least 0.5, to match the observed data.16   This lower bound occurs for 
intermediate values of the share of the variance of governance due to measurement 
error.  It is also interesting to ask what a reasonable value for this share might be, in 
order to pin down more precisely how strong halo effects must be.  One way to do so is 
to consider the standard errors of the governance estimates, which average around 0.25 
as compared with the standard deviation of measured governance of 1.  This suggests 
that the share of the variance of governance due to the error term is in fact quite small at 
s=0.252=0.06.   For this low variance share, the halo effect correlation would need to be 
0.9 in order to match the observed data.  If the true correlation between governance and 
income were much lower, for example at 0.4, then even if measurement error in 
                                                
16 We do not consider higher values for the true correlation than 0.6.  This is because we are 
trying to see the extent to which halo effects might result in an observed correlation of 0.8 which 
is substantially higher than the true correlation.  If the observed correlation and the true 
correlation are close to each other, then the halo effects argument becomes unimportant 
empirically. 
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governance were perfectly correlated with per capita income it would not be possible to 
generate the observed correlation between governance and per capita incomes.   
 
This strong conclusion is driven by the assumption that that measurement error 
accounts for a relatively small portion of the variation in observed governance.  As a 
result this measurement error needs to be very highly correlated with incomes in order to 
match the data.  One could argue that we are understating the importance of 
measurement error by relying on the estimated standard errors from our governance 
indicators.  After all, these are based on the assumption that measurement error is 
uncorrelated across different sources of governance data.  However, if halo effects are 
important, the measurement error in individual sources will be correlated not only with 
per capita income, but also with each other.  This in turn would imply a greater 
imprecision of the governance estimates.  To capture this possibility, suppose that the 
standard error of the governance estimates were twice as large as what we actually 
have, at 0.5.17  This implies s=0.25, and for this value of s we can see from Figure 6 that 
the halo effect correlation would still need to be very high at almost 0.6 in order to match 
the data. 
 
 In summary, these results suggest to us that although halo effects may well be 
present in perceptions-based measures of governance, these halo effects need to be 
implausibly strong in order to impart a substantial upward bias in the correlation between 
measured governance and per capita incomes.  Moreover, it is worth noting that there 
may well be other factors offsetting such halo effects.  One is the tendency of survey 
respondents in developed countries to be particularly critical of their own institutions.18  It 
is also worth noting that some cross-country polls of experts deliberately apply higher 
standards to rich countries when assessing their governance.19  Overall, then, we do not 
                                                
17 In Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Table 5, we show that the estimated margins of 
error would be roughly twice as large if we assume that the correlation of error terms across 
sources is 0.5 instead of 0. 
18 For treatments of these effects in survey data, see Kaufmann and  Wei (1999) and Hellman, 
Kaufmann  and Schankerman (2000)  
19 For example, in our discussions with PRS, we learned that this source penalizes rich countries 
that in their view have the resources to reduce corruption but fail to do so. 
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think that halo effects are a significant source of bias in the correlations between 
governance and per capita incomes our data.20 
 
5.2 Controlling for Income in Governance Comparisons 
 
 In a recent paper, Sachs and others (2004) have argued that weak governance is 
not a major factor in Africa’s poor growth performance.  The argument is that, once we 
control for per capita income, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have particularly 
poor governance indicators.  This point is illustrated in Figure 7, which plots our 2004 
Rule of Law measure (on the vertical axis) against the logarithm of real per capita GDP 
in the mid-1990s (on the horizontal axis).  Note that the per capita income variable has 
been rescaled to have mean zero and standard deviation of one, as does the 
governance indicator. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are highlighted in red.  A striking 
observation from this graph is that over half (27 out of 46) of the countries in the region 
actually fall above the simple ordinary least squares regression line, shown in black.  At 
first glance, this appears to lend credence to the argument that governance in Africa is 
on average what one might expect given the region’s low income levels.   
 
 However, it is misleading to conclude from this simple graph that Africa’s 
governance performance is reasonable given its per capita income.  This interpretation 
of the graph is valid only to the extent that the OLS regression line would capture a 
causal relationship from higher income to better governance.  But a large body of 
research indicates that there is substantial causation in the other direction as well – 
better governance leads to higher incomes.  Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated 
effect of governance on per capita incomes in the long run is large.21 Available estimates 
suggest that a one standard deviation improvement in governance would lead to a two- 
to three-fold difference in income levels in the long run.  A one standard deviation 
change in governance would correspond to, for example the difference between Kenya 
                                                
20 It is of course possible that halo effects are associated with countries’ recent growth 
performance, rather than with income levels.  We can use the analysis of this section to consider 
this case as well.  The main insight is that since the correlation between recent growth and 
governance is typically fairly modest, growth-related halo effects would not need to be as large in 
order to impart a proportionately larger bias to this correlation. 
21 See for example Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000), Kaufmann 
and Kraay (2002), Alcala and Ciccone (2004), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), and 
Rigobon and Rodrik (2004). 
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and Turkey on our 2004 Rule of Law indicator.  This means that the simple OLS 
relationship will exaggerate the positive effects of income on governance because it also 
reflects the strong effect in the opposite direction, from governance to incomes. In order 
to compare governance in Sub-Saharan Africa to what might be expected given income 
levels, we need to first isolate these two directions of causation, so to be able to focus in 
particular on the causal effect of income on governance.   
 
 The red and green lines in Figure 7 show two alternative estimates of the causal 
effect of income on governance.  The (slightly) upward-sloping one, in red, comes from 
Rigobon and Rodrik (2004).  They study the causal relationships between per capita 
income, democracy, rule of law, openness to international trade, and geography, using 
identification through heteroskedasticity to isolate the causal effects.22  As expected, this 
red line is substantially flatter than the OLS regression line, consistent with the intuition 
that the latter relationship overstated the true causal effect of incomes on governance.  
This flattening has important consequences for our conclusions about the quality of 
governance in Africa controlling for income levels.  Once we isolate this much weaker 
effect of income on governance, we find that only 7 out of 46 countries in the region fall 
above the regression line:  Ghana, Lesotho, Cape Verde, Namibia, South Africa, 
Botswana, and Mauritius.  In contrast, the vast majority of countries in Africa have 
governance that is worse than their income levels would predict.    
 
 The weakly downward-sloping green line presents another estimate of the effect 
of income on governance, coming from Kaufmann and Kraay (2002).  In this paper we 
used a different approach to identification and found a zero or even negative impact of 
income on governance.  While this finding may be somewhat extreme, it leads to the 
same conclusions regarding the quality of governance in Africa – now only 6 out of 46 
countries in the region fall above the regression line, indicating governance levels better 
than what per capita incomes would predict.   
                                                
22 We use their specification excluding democracy, which implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in log per capita GDP improves rule of law by 0.14 standard deviations.  They use a 
different measure of rule of law for the mid-1990s taken from Knack and Keefer (1995).  
However, its correlation with our rule of law indicator is above 0.8, so we can reasonably use the 
estimated coefficient from this paper with our governance indicator, suitably standardized.  Note 
also that in the system of equations estimated by Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) the conditional 
expectation of governance given per capita income also reflects the indirect effects of income on 
openness, which in turn affects the rule of law.  However, these estimated indirect effects are so 
small that our conclusions are essentially unaffected by ignoring them. 
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Overall this evidence suggests that it would be inappropriate to discount the 
governance performance of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa based on their low income 
levels.  The reason is simple.  The only way to justify such a discount is to argue that 
higher incomes exert a positive causal effect on governance.  But available evidence 
suggests that the causal impact of incomes on governance is small.  Rather, the 
observed correlation between governance and per capita incomes primarily reflects 
causation in the other direction:  better governance raises per capita incomes.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
There is by now broad consensus among academics and policymakers alike that 
good governance matters for economic development.  There is also growing awareness 
in the aid community that good governance matters for the effectiveness of development 
assistance.  In light of this it is important to be able to measure levels and changes over 
time in governance across countries.  This paper summarizes our recent work to 
construct aggregate governance indicators which seek to provide such information.  
Relative to previous years, these indicators reflect a significant expansion of our 
underlying data set of several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of 
governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources. 
 
In our work we have emphasized the difficulty of measuring governance.  We 
have argued that one of the strengths of our composite governance indicators is that 
they can be more informative than individual data sources: on average the aggregation 
reduces the margin of error by about one-half.  Further, given the increasing number of 
separate data sources now at our disposal to construct these aggregate indicators, we 
find that the margins of error of the latest period under measure are smaller than in 
earlier periods.  However, these margins of error, even in our most recent aggregate 
indicators, still remain substantial, and thus all our previous cautionary suggestions 
regarding interpretation continue to apply.    
 
At the same time, we have emphasized that these margins of error are not 
unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all 
efforts to measure governance.  In fact, we have argued that, for the purposes of 
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measuring governance, there are few alternatives to the subjective, experiential data on 
which we rely.  Even in cases where objective indicators of governance are available, we 
have noted that these too have implicit margins of error, and we have provided 
calculations indicating that these margins of error are on the same order of magnitude as 
those associated with our subjective aggregates.  We have also provided evidence that 
the type of perceptions data on which we rely provides insights into governance that are 
difficult to obtain from more objective or quantifiable measures.  For example, we have 
shown that firms’ perceptions of the difficulty of starting a new business, or of their tax 
burdens, do not depend solely on the relevant legal framework governing business entry 
and taxation but are also influenced by the degree of corruption in their country, 
suggesting that not only do formal rules matter, but also the institutional environment in 
which these rules are applied and enforced.  Thus, wherever objective data on 
governance or investment climate are collected, a comprehensive analysis of 
governance and institutional change ought to be complemented by data from the reports 
of the economic agents on the ground, such as firms or users of services, which 
inevitably will contain an element of subjectivity.  Finally, to corroborate the relevance 
and validity of using subjective data, we have also empirically investigated, and for the 
most part discounted, the importance of ideological biases in the perceptions data from 
polls of experts on which we rely.   
 
 Policymakers are often particularly interested in trends in institutional quality:  is 
governance improving or worsening over time in a particular country?  As we have 
emphasized in our work, the presence of measurement error in all types of governance 
indicators, including our own, makes assessing trends in governance a challenging 
undertaking.  In this paper we developed a formal statistical methodology, as well as a 
simple rule of thumb, for identifying changes in governance that are likely to be 
statistically and practically significant.  Over the eight-year period from 1996-2004 
spanned by our governance indicators, we find that in about  5 to 7 percent of countries  
we can be confident (at the 90 percent significance level) that governance has changed 
substantially.  And at a lower 75 percent significance level, roughly 20 percent of all 
observed changes stand out as significant.  Importantly, we show that there is a great 
deal of agreement among our many data sources about the direction of change in 
governance in these countries.  Overall this reminds us that while often institutional 
quality changes takes place haltingly, gradually, or not at all, there are also countries 
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where one can point to sharp improvements or deteriorations even over a fairly short 
eight-year period.  Significant and rapid institutional change, while not the norm, is 
feasible and does take place in practice.  
 
 Finally, we have discussed two important issues that arise in interpreting the 
strong positive correlation between governance and income levels.  Some observers 
have argued that these positive correlations are substantially due to “halo effects” – 
perceptions of governance in rich countries are good simply because the countries are 
rich.  We have argued that such halo effects would need to be implausibly large to 
account for cross-country correlations between governance and incomes.   
 
We have also considered the frequently-heard argument that poor levels of 
governance should be significantly discounted where the country is poor.  Put differently, 
to what extent does it make sense to ask whether a country is well or poorly governed 
given its income level?   This issue is often raised in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where too many countries are both very poor, and very poorly governed.  We make the 
simple observation that in order to answer this question, it is necessary to isolate the 
causal impact of income levels on governance.  Simply relying on the observed 
correlation is inappropriate, as much of this reflects strong causal effects running from 
governance to per capita incomes.   While identifying the effects of income on 
governance is difficult, the few available estimates suggest that this feedback effect is 
minimal.  As a result, there is little basis on which to argue that the poor governance 
performance many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa should be discounted simply based 
on low income levels.  
 
In conclusion, it is important to keep some perspective on this contribution.  
While these aggregate governance indicators have been useful in providing a general 
snapshot of the countries of the world for various broad components of governance, now 
for 8 years, and while the margins of error have declined over time, they remain a rather 
blunt instrument for specific policy advice at the country level.  As we have argued in the 
past, these aggregate indicators need to be complemented with in-depth in-country 
governance diagnostics, based on micro-surveys of households, firms and public 
officials within the country.  The lessons being drawn from these combined aggregate 
and micro-data sets do point to the importance of moving concretely to the next stage of 
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governance reforms, in Africa and elsewhere.  These, among others, are to stress 
reforms in transparency (such as natural resource revenue transparency mechanisms, 
disclosure of assets of politicians, voting records of parliamentarians, political campaign 
contributions, and fiscal accounts), in altering incentives in institutions so to increasingly 
focus on prevention and deterrence (rather than overly relying on prosecutions), and in 
working more closely with other key actors outside the public sector as well, such as the 
heretofore neglected private sector.   
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Figure 1:  The Development Dividend of Good Governance 
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Figure 2:  Margins of Error for Governance Indicators, 2004 
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Figure 3:  Changes Over Time in Governance Indicators 1996-2004 
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Figure 4:  Significance of Changes in Individual Measures of Governance 
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Figure 5:  Changes in Measures of Ease of Business Entry, 2003-2004 
 
 
 
Vietnam
Slovak Republic
Serbia
Jordan
Japan
Indonesia
France
Czech Republic
Brazil
Argentina
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
-70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
Days to Start
 a Business (DB)
Easy to Start a 
Business (GCS)
 45
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Halo Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Share of Variance of g* Due to Measurement 
Error (s)
St
re
ng
th
 o
f H
al
o 
Ef
fe
ct
 R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
M
at
ch
 D
at
a 
(C
or
r(
u,
y)
)
Corr(g*,y)=0
Corr(g*,y)=0.2
Corr(g*,y)=0.4
Corr(g*,y)=0.6
 
 46
 
Figure 7:  Governance and Per Capita Incomes in Africa 
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Table 1:  Global Trends in Governance 1996-2004 for Selected Sources 
 
 
 
[Quasi-Balanced Sample]* ** *** †
   World Average    Std. Dev. Across Countries
# of 
Countries 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
t-statistic for 
mean difference
1996-2004
Voice and Accountability
EIU 115 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.28 1.5
PRS * 140 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.7
GCS ** 88 .. .. .. 0.49 0.51 .. .. .. 0.14 0.14 ….
FRH (PR+CL) 190 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.7
FRH (Press Freedom) 188 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 -0.2
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.55 0.53 .. .. .. 0.26 0.22 …
Political Stability
EIU 115 0.54 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.7
PRS * 140 0.78 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.13 -1.5
GCS ** 88 0.73 0.74 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.13 -2.5   [-2.4]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.67 0.56 .. .. .. 0.24 0.20 …
Government  Effectiveness
EIU 115 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.30 -0.2
PRS * 140 0.63 0.66 0.57 0.64 0.62 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.15 -0.4
GCS ** 82 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.23 1.9   [2.8]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.56 0.55 .. .. .. 0.23 0.22 …
Regulatory Quality
EIU 115 0.42 .. .. 0.51 0.55 0.25 .. .. 0.25 0.23 4.3
GCS ** 82 0.43 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.13 -3.4  [-3.0]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.58 0.61 .. .. .. 0.25 0.17 …
HERITAGE *** 155 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.0
Rule of Law
EIU 115 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 1.4
PRS * 140 0.72 0.62 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.22 -3.4
GCS ** 82 0.67 0.63 0.57 0.51 0.51 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.22 -4.6   [-2.9]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.58 0.57 .. .. .. 0.23 0.20 …
HERITAGE *** 155 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.28 -1.8
QLM 115 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.1
Control of Corruption
EIU 115 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.2
PRS * 140 0.59 0.51 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 -7.2
GCS ** 82 .. 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.66 .. 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.0   [-0.1]†
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.52 0.54 .. .. .. 0.27 0.20 …
QLM 115 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 -0.2
Note that all variables are scaled to run from 0 to 1
*  PRS Country coverage in 1996: 129 countries, all other periods 140.
** GCS Country coverage in 1996: 58; in 1998: 59; in 2000: 75; and in 2002 and in 2004: 82. 
*** Heritage Country coverage in 1996: 137; all other periods 155.
† Values in square brackets for GCS report t-stats for fully balanced sample from 1996 (same 52 countries)
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Table 2:  Classifying Countries for the MCA 
 
 
 
 
Control of Corruption WMO DRI GCS
2004 2000 1996 2004 2004 2004
Probability of Being
Above the Median Is:
Number of Countries
Below 10% 17 15 16 10 5 3
Below 25% 24 24 19 17 11 6
Between 25% and 75% 20 20 18 38 11 12
Above 75% 26 25 15 15 12 12
Above 90% 23 22 11 6 7 8
Total Number of Countries 70 69 52 70 34 30
Proportion of Countries
Below 10% 0.24 0.22 0.31 0.14 0.15 0.10
Below 25% 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.24 0.32 0.20
Between 25% and 75% 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.54 0.32 0.40
Above 75% 0.37 0.36 0.29 0.21 0.35 0.40
Above 90% 0.33 0.32 0.21 0.09 0.21 0.27
Average Standard Error 0.18 0.25 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.44  
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  Table 3:  Imputed Margins of Error for Objective Governance Indicators 
 
Corresponding Absolute Actual Margin of 
Objective Subjective Value of Implied Margin of Error for Objective Indicator Error for Subjective
Indicator Indicator Correlation (A) (B) (C) Indicator
Telephone Wait Time GE 0.56 1.43 0.88 0.58 0.21
Phone Faults GE 0.32 2.92 1.47 1.00 0.21
Trade Tax Revenue GE 0.50 1.68 1.00 0.67 0.21
Budgetary Volatility GE 0.50 1.68 1.00 0.67 0.21
Revenue Source Volatility GE 0.49 1.71 1.01 0.67 0.21
Contract Intensive Money RL 0.57 1.39 0.86 0.57 0.19
Contract Enforcement RL 0.40 2.25 1.22 0.82 0.19
Regulation of Entry RQ 0.50 1.67 1.00 0.66 0.22
Aggregate Objective Indicator GE 0.73 0.88 0.60 0.39 0.21  
 
Notes:  This table reports the margins of error for objective indicators implied by the observed correlation between objective and subjective indicators, as 
discussed in Section 4.3 in the text.  
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Table 4:  De Jure and De Facto Measures 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable is GCS '04:  "Easy to Start a Business?"
1 2 3 4 5
All Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -1.18 -0.43 -0.47 -0.60 -0.59
5.46*** 1.87* 1.96* 4.33*** 4.19***
Corporate Tax Rate -0.01 0.01
1.06 0.69
Control of Corruption (2002) 0.47 0.45 0.18 0.18
6.14*** 5.84*** 2.80*** 2.81***
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) 0.75 0.77
9.86*** 9.05***
Observations (# of countries) 81 81 81 81 81
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 0.44 0.44 0.71 0.71
Developing Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -0.49 -0.32 -0.29 -0.49 -0.47
1.44 0.95 0.86 2.42** 2.25**
Corporate Tax Rate 0.01 0.01
0.66 0.73
Control of Corruption (2002) 0.50 0.53 0.19 0.22
3.30*** 3.08*** 1.48 1.67
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) 0.83 0.82
8.76*** 8.73***
Observations (# of countries) 56 56 56 56 56
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.19 0.18 0.57 0.57
OECD + Newly-Industrialized Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -0.97 -0.53 -0.57 -0.73 -0.74
3.29*** 1.65 1.88* 3.41*** 3.33***
Corporate Tax Rate -0.04 0.00
1.92* 0.09
Control of Corruption (2002) 0.75 0.62 0.29 0.29
2.85*** 2.38** 1.28 1.25
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) 0.64 0.65
4.44*** 3.51***
Observations (# of countries) 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.36 0.46 0.69 0.67
Note:  DB refers to "Doing Business" study, GCS refers to Global Competitiveness Survey  
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Table 4, Cont’d:  De Jure and De Facto Measures 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable is GCS '04:  "How Heavy Is Overall Tax Burden?"
1 2 3 4 5
All Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -0.96 -0.27
0.46 0.15
Corporate Tax Rate 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.18
2.37** 2.29** 2.22** 1.58 1.55
Control of Corruption (2002) -0.77 -0.96 0.58 0.52
1.27 1.19 0.91 0.62
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) -4.29 -4.28
3.91*** 3.91***
Observations (# of countries) 81 81 81 81 81
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.23
Developing Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) -2.06 -1.46
0.68 0.54
Corporate Tax Rate 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
0.71 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.11
Control of Corruption (2002) -2.66 -2.80 -1.59 -1.71
1.78* 1.88* 1.07 1.16
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) -2.93 -2.87
1.62 1.60
Observations (# of countries) 56 56 56 56 56
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.08
OECD + Newly-Industrialized Countries
# of Days to start business (DB '04) 0.96 2.37
0.35 0.93
Corporate Tax Rate 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.33 0.32
4.59*** 4.43*** 4.52*** 3.56*** 3.90***
Control of Corruption (2002) 0.47 0.78 2.63 3.49
0.23 0.32 1.70 1.94*
Administrative Regulations (GCS ‘04) -5.15 -5.38
4.54*** 4.89***
Observations (# of countries) 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.65 0.65
Note:  DB refers to "Doing Business" study, GCS refers to Global Competitiveness Survey  
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Appendix 1:  Statistical Significance of Changes in Aggregate Indicators 
 
 In this Appendix we extend the discussion in Section 3 of the paper to the 
problem of making inferences about changes over time in country governance based on 
our aggregate indicators.  We develop a two-period version of the unobserved 
components model that we have used to construct the aggregate indicators in each 
period.  We then use it to be more precise about the statistical significance of changes 
over time in our estimates of governance.   
 
Let y(j,k,t) denote the governance assessment provided by individual data source 
k in period t for country j.  We use a two-period version of the unobserved components 
model to express this observed data as a linear function of unobserved governance in 
country j at time t, g(j,t), and an error term capturing the various sources of 
measurement error that we have been discussing, ε(j,k,t):   
 
(6) ( ))t,k,j()t,j(g)t,k()t,k()t,k,j(y ε+⋅β+α=  
 
The intercept and slope parameters α(k,t) and β(k,t) vary by data source and over time.  
As in our single-period model we assume that unobserved governance and the error 
terms are normally distributed with mean zero.  We maintain the identifying assumption 
that unobserved governance and the all the error terms are mutually independent, i.e. [ ] 0)s,k,j()t,j(gE =ε⋅  for all sources k and periods t and s, and [ ] 0)s,m,j()t,k,j(E =ε⋅ε  for 
all sources k different from m and for all periods t and s.  We also maintain as a choice 
of units that the variance of unobserved governance is one in each period, i.e. [ ] 0)t,j(gE 2 =  for all t.  Our only substantive new assumption relative to the basic one-
period unobserved components model that we use to construct our governance 
indicators is that unobserved governance is correlated over time, as are the error terms, 
i.e. [ ] ρ=−⋅ )1t,j(g)t,j(gE , and [ ] )1t,k()t,k(r)1t,k,j()t,k,j(E k −σ⋅σ⋅=−ε⋅ε , where ρ and 
rk are the correlations over time of governance and the error term in source k, 
respectively. 
 
 Next let y(j,t) denote the Kx1 vector of observed data for each country; α(t), β(t), 
σ(t)2 and r denote the Kx1 vectors of the parameters in period t; and let B(t), Σ(t) and R 
denote KxK matrices with the vectors β(t), σ(t)2 and r on their diagonals.  Then using the 
properties of the multivariate normal distribution, the joint distribution of unobserved 
governance in the two periods in a country, conditional on the observed data for that 
country is normal with mean and variance: 
 
(7) 
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where B is a block-diagonal matrix with B(t) and B(t-1) on the diagonal, and ι is a Kx1 
vector of ones.  The covariance matrix Ω has the following block form:  
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⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ΩΩ
ΩΩ=Ω
2221
1211 , with )t('11 Σ+ιι=Ω , 2/12/12112 )1t()t(R'' −ΣΣ+ριι=Ω=Ω , and 
)1t('22 −Σ+ιι=Ω .23   
 
The conditional mean and variance in Equation (7) are just the two-period 
generalizations of the estimates of governance and their precision based on the one-
period unobserved components model (see Equations (2) and (3) in Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2004)).  In fact, if we set ρ=rk=0 for all sources k, then we recover exactly 
the estimates of governance that we had before.  The advantage of this two-period 
formulation is that we now have specified the joint distribution of governance in the two 
periods for each country, conditional on the observed data in the two periods.  Since we 
have modeled the joint distribution over the two periods of governance, we can base 
inferences about governance in the two periods, as well as changes in governance, on 
this joint distribution.   We also note that the discussion of inference about changes over 
time in governance based on individual indicators in the previous section is just a special 
case of this more general formulation.24 
 
 We implement this two-period model using our actual dataset, over the period 
1996-2004.  We restrict attention to a balanced set of sources that are available in both 
periods for the two indicators.  In order to implement this calculation, we need to have 
estimates of the parameters of the model in both periods (the α’s, β’s, and σ’s), as well 
as estimates of the correlation over time of the errors in the individual sources (the r’s) 
and the correlation of unobserved governance itself, ρ.  We obtain these parameters in 
two steps.  First, we estimate the one-period unobserved components model in 1996 
and in 2004, to obtain estimates of the α’s, β’s, and σ’s.  We refer to this as the “static 
model” estimates.  We also retrieve the estimates of governance and standard errors 
from the static model, to use as a basis for comparisons with the two-period model.  
Second, we calculate the correlation over time of these static estimates of governance 
as an estimate of ρ.  In this second step we also insert the estimated parameters of the 
static model into Equation (6) and retrieve estimates of the errors in the sources in the 
two periods as residuals.  The correlation over time in these estimated residuals serves 
as our estimate of the correlation in the errors.  We then insert all the estimated 
parameters, together with the data, into Equation (7) to obtain our final estimates of 
governance in the two periods conditional on the data, as well as the variance-
                                                
23 To obtain Equation (7), note that the (2K+2)x1 vector ( )')1t(y),t(y),1t(g),t(g −−  is normally 
distributed with mean ( )')1t(),t(,0,0 −αα  and variance-covariance matrix V with the following 
block form:  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ρ
ρ=
1
1
V11 , B''
''
V12 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ιι⋅ρ
ι⋅ρι= , and 'BBV22 Ω= .  Standard results for the 
partitioned multivariate normal distribution imply that the distribution of governance conditional on 
the observed data is normal with mean and variance given by Equation (7). 
24 To see this, set the number of sources K=1 and assume that α(t)=0, β(t)=1, and σ(t)=σ for this 
one source.  Equation (5) then gives the conditional mean and variance of the level of 
governance in the two periods based on this single source.    The expected change in 
governance conditional on the data is then just the difference between the conditional means in 
the two periods, and the conditional variance of the change is just the sum of the variances in the 
two periods less twice the covariance.   
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covariance matrix of these estimates.  We refer to these as the “dynamic model” 
estimates. 
 
 Appendix Table A1 summarizes the results of this calculation for the six 
governance indicators.  In the top panel we present some summary statistics to aid in 
the comparison of governance estimates based on the single-period, or static model, 
and the two-period, or dynamic model.  In the first two columns we report the correlation 
between the estimates of governance based on the static and dynamic models, in the 
two periods, 2004 and 1996.  These correlations are virtually one for all six indicators in 
both periods, suggesting that our estimates of the levels governance do not change very 
much if we take into account persistence in governance and in the error terms.  The third 
column reports the correlation of the change over time in the estimates of governance 
according to the two models.  In light of the high correlations in levels between the two 
models, it is not very surprising that the correlation of changes is also very high, 
averaging 0.93 across the six indicators. 
 
 The next two columns of Appendix Table A1 report the average absolute change 
in the governance estimates for the static and dynamic models.  These changes are 
roughly half as large in the dynamic model than in the static model, averaging 0.17 and 
0.32 respectively.  The reason the dynamic model gives much smaller estimates of the 
change in governance over time is because the estimated persistence in governance is 
quite strong relative to the estimated persistence in the error terms.  Averaging across 
the six indicators, the persistence in unobserved governance is estimated to be 0.89.  
This is over twice as large as the persistence in the error terms, which averages 0.42 
across all sources and indicators.  Based on our intuitions from the simple example 
above, we should expect to find substantially smaller estimates of the change in 
governance when we take this pattern of persistence into account, and this is in fact 
what happens. 
 
 The bottom panel of Appendix Table A1 summarizes the consequences of this 
persistence for inference about changes in governance.  Formally our objective is to test 
the null hypothesis that the change in unobserved governance is zero conditional on the 
observed data.  We begin by calculating the z-statistic associated with this hypothesis 
for each country, using the static and dynamic models.  For the static model, we simply 
take the absolute change in our estimate of governance, and divide by the square root of 
the sum of the variances of the estimate of governance in the two periods.  For the 
dynamic model, we calculate the variance of the change in governance as the sum of 
the estimated variances in the two periods, minus twice the estimated covariance 
between the two periods.  The square root of this variance becomes the denominator of 
the z-statistic for the dynamic model.  The average z-statistics are smaller in the 
dynamic model than in the static model, again consistent with the intuitions developed 
above.  For the static model, the z-statistics average 0.82, as opposed to 0.59 for the 
dynamic model.  This in turn implies fewer statistically significant changes in governance 
based on the dynamic model, as reported in the next two columns.  The average number 
of significant changes at the 10 percent level falls by half from 21 to 10 once we take 
persistence into account.  
 
 Although a relatively small number of changes in the aggregate indicators signal 
statistically significant changes in unobserved governance, it is worth noting that the 
proportion of significant changes is much higher for the aggregate indicator than it is for 
individual indicators.  Recall from the previous subsection that only the top one percent 
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of changes in an individual indicator with typical persistence in unobserved governance 
and the error term would be significant at the 90 percent level.  This is not because 
individual indicators do not register large changes for individual countries – in fact 
frequently they do so.  Rather, it is because the margins of error associated with 
changes in individual data sources are large.  In contrast, for the aggregate indicators 
we find that between five and seven percent of all changes signal statistically significant 
changes in governance at the same significance level, reflecting the greater precision of 
the aggregate indicators.  This illustrates the benefits of aggregation for assessing 
changes over time, as well as levels, of governance.   
 
 
 Finally, it is useful to compare the statistically significant changes in governance 
identified by the dynamic model with the “large” changes in governance we identified in 
Section 2.3 of this paper using a very simple rule of thumb.  We begin by identifying all 
changes in governance based on the static model for which the 90 percent confidence 
intervals in the two periods do not overlap, as per the rule of thumb.  Note that this is a 
more stringent condition for identifying significant changes in governance than the t-tests 
for the static model we have just discussed.25  On average, there are nine significant 
changes in governance per indicator according to this rule of thumb applied to the simple 
static model, as compared with 10 in the dynamic model.  There is a remarkable degree 
of overlap between the significant changes identified by the rule of thumb and the 
dynamic model.  On average, eight of the nine changes identified by the rule of thumb 
are also significant in the dynamic model.  Moreover, comparing the second and third-
last columns of this panel, it is clear that the dynamic model turns up very few significant 
changes not identified by the rule of thumb.  Although the simple rule of thumb and the 
more formal model turn up more or less the same set of significant changes in 
governance, it is important to note that the magnitude of these changes is substantially 
smaller in the formal dynamic model.  
 
 In summary, we have developed a dynamic version of the single-period 
unobserved components model that we have used to construct our aggregate 
governance indicators.  The advantage of specifying a dynamic version of the model is 
that it allows us to make formal statistical inferences about changes in unobserved 
governance based on our changes in the composite governance indicators.  But this 
advantage comes at a cost.  The two-period model is substantially more complicated to 
implement, particularly when the set of underlying data sources is not the same in both 
periods.  Given that the number of data sources we use has expanded substantially over 
time, this is a significant limitation.  Fortunately, however, we have seen that using a 
simple rule of thumb for identifying large changes over time in our static or single-period 
estimates of governance corresponds quite closely to formal inference regarding the 
significance of changes in governance.   Because of this, we continue to use the single-
period unobserved components model to construct the aggregate governance indicators 
in each period, and recommend using the simple rule of thumb that 90 percent 
confidence intervals do not overlap for identifying changes in governance that are likely 
to be statistically significant.
                                                
25 Requiring 90 percent confidence intervals not to overlap is equivalent to requiring the absolute 
change in estimated governance to be larger than the sum of the standard errors in the two 
periods.  This sum is always larger than the square root of the sum of the squares of these 
standard errors. 
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Appendix Table A1:  Persistence and Inference About Changes in Governance Over Time 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Correlations Mean Absolute Changes Persistence
Levels, 
2004
Levels, 
1996
Changes, 
1996-2004 Static Dynamic Governance
Average for 
Source Errors
VA 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.27 0.14 0.93 0.39
PV 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.44 0.30 0.78 0.39
GE 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.27 0.11 0.92 0.35
RQ 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.36 0.21 0.86 0.36
RL 0.99 0.99 0.88 0.23 0.12 0.94 0.53
CC 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.33 0.16 0.89 0.50
Average 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.32 0.17 0.89 0.42  
 
Consequences of Persistence for Inference 
 
Mean t-Statistics Number Significant at 90% Rule of Thumb
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Number 
Significant
Also Significant in 
Dynamic Model
VA 0.85 0.57 26 13 12 12
PV 0.91 0.78 21 18 14 14
GE 0.69 0.41 12 1 1 1
RQ 0.86 0.63 25 14 11 9
RL 0.73 0.55 16 7 7 5
CC 0.90 0.58 26 7 10 7
Average 0.82 0.59 21 10 9 8
 
